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The Trump administration’s January 2025 Golden Dome executive order set the stage for a massive expansion of U.S. missile defenses. Whereas the United States’ existing homeland missile defenses are designed to counter ballistic missile threats from “rogue states” like North Korea and Iran, Golden Dome will include defenses against a wider array of missile threats, including attacks by near-peer adversaries. If effective, Chinese and Russian analysts argue that Golden Dome could limit their countries’ ability to target the United States’ homeland with nuclear weapons and thereby undermine their strategic deterrents. This article surveys Chinese and Russian reactions to the Golden Dome and develops an initial assessment of its potential impact on arms racing and strategic stability.
Chinese and Russian commentary about Golden Dome has three noteworthy features. First, Chinese and Russian analysts contend that Golden Dome is emblematic of the United States’ continued destabilizing pursuit of strategic advantage, but also represents a more aggressive break from previous policies and poses an elevated threat to second-strike survivability. Second, Chinese and Russian experts acknowledge uncertainty about Golden Dome’s scope and design, leaving room for speculation on what form it might take. Third, while China and Russia are concerned about Golden Dome’s potential impact on strategic stability, analysts also express skepticism about the system’s feasibility and, in Russia’s case, optimism about countering the system. In response to Golden Dome, both China and Russia are poised to pursue asymmetric countermeasures that leverage perceived areas of advantage. Notably, their responses are likely to involve intensifying existing programs and efforts (e.g., numerical buildup and unconventional delivery systems), rather than a horizontal expansion into completely new capabilities.
China sees Golden Dome as just another instance of the United States’ pursuit of “absolute security” (绝对安全)—a security advantage without regard to the concerns of others. For example, shortly after the program’s announcement, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson claimed that it represents an “unconstrained” development of a comprehensive missile defense system, which violates the Outer Space Treaty (OST) and increases the risk of an arms race and the militarization of space. Note that China has developed and tested a fractional orbital bombardment capability that could violate the OST, if ever used. China and Russia even mentioned Golden Dome in a May 8 joint statement on global strategic stability, which accused the United States of seeking “overwhelming military superiority.”
At the same time, Chinese experts view Golden Dome as representing a more aggressive break from previous U.S. positions. Two scholars, writing in the journal Contemporary International Relations (published by the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, a research center under the Ministry of State Security), argue that Golden Dome represents a “fundamental break” (根本性突破) from the focus on “rogue actors” under Obama, or even Biden’s “integrated deterrence.” Instead, the United States, not satisfied with having the ability to intercept a limited nuclear attack, seeks the ability to address strategic strikes from great powers, reflecting a “deeper skepticism of traditional deterrence logic.” Guo Xiaobing, director of the Center for Arms Control Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, makes a similar point in a commentary. He argues that Golden Dome exemplifies the United States’ desire to develop “left-of-launch” (发射左侧) capabilities, which undermines strategic stability. Guo also notes that Golden Dome explicitly targets Russia and China for the first time, indicating a new degree of hostility.
The Kremlin likewise views Golden Dome as a destabilizing escalation of past U.S. missile defense efforts. Russian leaders have long expressed concerns about the threat that U.S. homeland missile defense, in combination with U.S. and allied long-range missiles, poses to Russia’s second-strike capability. Kremlin officials criticize Golden Dome along the same lines. In Russia and China’s joint statement, they describe the threat posed by the combination of Golden Dome and U.S. and allied strike capabilities, saying that the latter “can be employed for the purposes of delivering... a first strike, in calculation to repel a radically weakened retaliatory strike with air and missile defense assets.” The statement criticizes Golden Dome as a “complete and ultimate rejection” of the relationship between offensive and defensive strategic systems, and argues that Golden Dome’s left-of-launch missile defeat concept is intended to undermine adversaries’ nuclear deterrents and indicates that the United States seeks to achieve “strategic invulnerability.”
Russian officials have expressed particular concern about the role of space-based interceptors. MFA spokesperson Maria Zakharova warned that “Golden Dome provides for reinforcing combat capabilities in outer space... effectively turning outer space into a deployment area and an arena for military confrontation,” while Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov asserted that space-based interceptors are “extremely destabilizing” and create a “direct path not only to the militarization of outer space, but also to its transformation into an arena of armed confrontation.” The deputy director for nonproliferation and arms control at the MFA, Konstantin Vorontsov, similarly claimed that Golden Dome and projects like it risk starting an arms race in space. As with China, the Kremlin’s position is highly hypocritical, given its reported plans to deploy a nuclear weapon in orbit. Such a system would constitute a flagrant violation of the OST and violate Russia and China’s joint pledge to “promote... the international initiative/political commitment not to be the first to deploy weapons in outer space.”
Chinese concerns about Golden Dome are perhaps exacerbated by the fact that there are few details about what Golden Dome consists of. This opens up interpretive space for Chinese analysts to speculate on what the system might include. For instance, in an article published in World Affairs [世界知识], a magazine affiliated with the MFA, authors speculate that Golden Dome would consist of the following “layers”:
Russian experts are similarly uncertain about what form Golden Dome will take. Aleksandr Ermakov, an analyst at the Moscow-based Institute of World Economy and International Relations, observes that the lack of information about Golden Dome’s design is likely due to the Department of Defense not having finalized plans for the system. Based on leaks, Ermakov assesses that Golden Dome may be intended to defeat attacks from states like North Korea and Iran and mitigate attacks from Russia and China.
While Chinese analysts are concerned about Golden Dome undermining strategic stability, they are also skeptical of the feasibility of the program on technical, economic, and political grounds. The Contemporary International Relations article points to a deficient U.S. industrial base and ongoing difficulties with the Next Generation Interceptor program, speculating that Golden Dome is likely to run into delays and challenges with systems integration. Another article published in Peace and Development, a journal with links to the People’s Liberation Army, similarly argues that Golden Dome is likely to suffer from technical difficulties. These authors also speculate that, like prior programs like the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile, Golden Dome programs are likely to have cost overruns, which will be difficult given the United States’ debt levels. Analysts also highlight domestic political opposition to the program, with some questioning whether it can survive beyond the Trump administration. Finally, Trump’s “America First” and insistence on burden sharing might cause friction with allies that undermine the required cooperation for Golden Dome.
Having said all that, despite these reasons for skepticism, since Chinese analysts view Golden Dome as further evidence of U.S. strategic hostility toward China, “a public abandonment of strategic stability,” the political message China perceives from the program is likely to be just as—if not more—significant than any technical results the program produces.
Russian experts question Golden Dome’s feasibility on similar grounds. Analysts raise doubts as to whether future presidential administrations will support the project, whether the United States can sustain the costs of fielding and maintaining Golden Dome, and whether the project is technologically possible. Director of the Institute for Advanced Strategic Studies at the Higher School of Economics and former secretary of Russia’s Security Council Andrei Kokoshin, for example, assesses that Golden Dome’s viability depends on the United States’ ability to sustain growing its national debt and the MAGA movement’s continued political success, neither of which is guaranteed. Ermakov, writing with Aleksandr Savelyev (a senior researcher at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations), similarly questions whether future U.S. presidents will be willing to pay for Golden Dome.
Russian officials and experts also voice confidence in Russia’s ability to counter Golden Dome. While Ryabkov warned on May 22 that Golden Dome “must be taken very seriously,” he added that “Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated that our strategic systems are equipped so that we can reliably break through any air defense systems,” and that he is confident that the U.S. “belief in its own invincibility via some technological achievements... will be refuted.” Russian analysts argue that Russia’s existing novel nuclear delivery systems—particularly the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and Poseidon long-range torpedo—ensure that Russia will be able to penetrate any future U.S. defenses.
Chinese analysts have thus far been quite vague about how China should respond to Golden Dome. One article claims that China should “assess the chain reactions that Golden Dome would initiate, and insist on China’s own defense policy while proactively participating in multilateral arms control dialogues that would advance global strategic stability” (author’s translation). More broadly—even before Golden Dome was announced— Chinese scholars have argued that China must restore mutually assured destruction (MAD) in response to what is perceived as an increasingly aggressive U.S. nuclear posture. While these commentaries stop short of recommending how China might restore MAD, it is possible to make an informed guess. First, China will likely continue its nuclear buildup and qualitative improvements to increase confidence in its second-strike capability. Indeed, China will likely see Golden Dome as a vindication, rather than an effect, of its decision to build up. Second, it will focus on perceived areas of advantage, specifically hypersonics, which Chinese analysts acknowledge pose a challenge to the current U.S. missile defenses. China will also invest in other preexisting systems that help address its concerns with missile defense, such as the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System.
Considering the Kremlin’s rapid development of new capabilities in response to the Bush administration’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and Strategic Defense Initiative, Russia may begin adjusting its force structure and posture before gaining clarity on Golden Dome’s shape or scope. Putin privately pledged in 2000 that Russia would pursue asymmetric countermeasures in response to U.S. homeland missile defense, and stated in 2001 that U.S. missile defense would not undermine Russian security, given Russia’s ability to overcome such systems. Russia has been working to modernize its strategic nuclear force to that end since the early 2000s, including through the development of novel delivery systems designed to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. Russian analysts have suggested that similar asymmetric countermeasures, including novel systems and anti-satellite weapons, are the best approach for countering Golden Dome. Given the confidence that Russian analysts have in the ability of Burevestnik and Poseidon to penetrate missile defenses, the Kremlin may devote additional resources to the development and production of those systems. Kokoshin additionally suggests that Russia should improve its early-warning and space surveillance capabilities.
Ultimately, responses thus far suggest that China and Russia may respond to Golden Dome by doubling down on areas of perceived advantage, rather than exploring options that they are not already pursuing. China and Russia will also likely continue to delegitimize Golden Dome—as exemplified in the joint statement—by framing it as yet another example of the United States’ hostile and destabilizing pursuit of military superiority. Perhaps more importantly, due to the perceived political signal Golden Dome is sending and the vagueness surrounding the program, it may influence Chinese and Russian force structure and posture even before the program matures with technical details, and regardless of whether the United States continues the program after Trump.
Raymond Wang is postdoctoral fellow at the Columbia-Harvard China and the World Program. Lachlan MacKenzie is an associate fellow with the Project on Nuclear Issues in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
