What Is the Strategy in the Ukraine-Russia Peace Negotiations?

Intensive negotiations are ongoing this week over another proposed peace plan for Ukraine. The 28-point plan leaked to the press before negotiations really got underway, causing outrage on both sides of the Atlantic over its seeming up-front concession of nearly all Russian points. This plan looks strikingly similar to other plans that Steve Witkoff, U.S. special envoy to the Middle East, proposed and leans heavily into Russian talking points. Further, the Trump administration is employing classic negotiation tactics more reflective of the cutthroat world of Manhattan real estate than the traditional caution and care of international politics. So will it work? How are negotiations likely to unfold?

Q1: What’s in the 28-point plan?

A1: The basic points are these: Ukraine would remain a sovereign country, but it would concede extensive territory to Russia, including areas that the Russian army does not currently hold. This speaks to Russia’s original claims that the inhabitants of those territories are Russian, not Ukrainian, and ignores how hard those very same citizens have fought from day one to push Russian forces back across the border. Other territories near the front would be frozen, to be negotiated after a ceasefire.

Ukraine also would be forced to make extensive military concessions that Kyiv has rejected before. Specifically, it rules out Ukraine joining NATO despite the fact that that goal is enshrined in Ukraine’s constitution; it limits the Ukrainian military’s size and capability; and it prevents NATO-country troops from operating in Ukraine during peacetime. These three elements together effectively gut any real security guarantee—a red line for Ukraine, which believes that Russia will use this pause in fighting to regroup, rearm, and reinvade.

Russia also would “be progressively re-integrated into the global economy,” with sanctions gradually lifted. Further, Moscow would have to compensate Ukraine for the damage it caused, with some seized Russian assets going toward Ukrainian reconstruction. Finally, Ukraine must hold elections within 100 days. This would be logistically difficult, but feasible, and President Zelensky has said before that he would be willing to leave office to make peace or secure NATO membership.

Q2: What has the reaction to the plan been?

A2: Initial reactions to the peace plan both in Ukraine and in NATO member countries have been strongly negative. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney quipped that the first point—Ukraine is a sovereign country—is a “good start.” But he went on to say what many world leaders have said: The plan needs work.

Critics have pointed out that the plan seems to immediately concede many of the items on the Russian wish list and gives Ukraine very little by way of security guarantees. President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen immediately pushed back with three key elements that the commission insists must be included in any peace plan: (1) Ukraine’s borders cannot be changed by force, (2) there can be no limits on Ukraine’s armed forces that would leave it “vulnerable to future attack,” and (3) the “centrality” of the European Union in securing peace for Ukraine “must be fully reflected,” with Ukraine “ultimately joining our Union.” These three points are in direct opposition to key elements of the peace plan. The question is whether Europe is in a position to force revisiting these points.

Von der Leyen also raised an issue not reflected in the peace plan, but prominent in the hearts and minds of every Ukrainian—the return of 20,000 Ukrainian children abducted and sent to Russia or Russian-controlled Ukraine. Officials in Kyiv have repeatedly told CSIS staff that this issue must be addressed in any peace deal.

Moscow, for its part, has stated that it will withhold comment on the proposed peace plan until discussions between the United States and Ukraine progress further. According to Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, Russia has not received any official information about the plan and will not engage with information received solely through media reports. He also noted that Moscow remains open to negotiations. Russia’s muted response suggests that Moscow feels confident that time is on its side and the trendlines are moving in its direction.

Trump administration officials responded to the criticism by insisting that the Russians were not the authors of the peace plan and that this document is the basis for negotiations, while President Trump again called Ukraine ungrateful for U.S. assistance. This sets up a strange dynamic where the United States is not a pro-European or even neutral mediator but is instead pursuing a separate track with a different goal and an aggressive timeline. That goal seems to be quick peace, no matter the long-term consequences.

Q3: Why was the plan leaked?

A3: Usually, leaks happen when someone has an agenda. They may want to increase pressure on one of the parties or, more frequently, scuttle the negotiations. Particularly with a contentious plan like this, leaking it early and describing it as Russian authored was sure to cause an immediate outcry. It will certainly bolster the Ukrainian negotiating position to have Europeans and Americans who disagree with the Trump administration’s pressure campaign on Ukraine speaking out against the more draconian elements of this plan.

Negotiations carried out in full public view tend to have millions of critics and few supporters. That’s partially fair. The nature of negotiations is compromise and sometimes painful concessions. When life and death are on the line, few are willing to just trust negotiators talking in secret. Rather, it is human nature to assume the worst and demand either a maximalist position in negotiations or to call for a return to arms. In such a situation, the negotiators must not only work the room and the parties to the negotiation, but they must also play a strategic public relations role to sell the eventual deal. To say the least, this round of negotiations did not start on a strong public relations footing. For these negotiations to have any chance of success, the eventual deal must not only do far more to protect Ukraine, but the parties to the deal must undertake a comprehensive campaign to get public buy-in for peace and overcome this suspicion.

Q4: Who is in the room?

A4: This has proven a routinely contentious point in negotiations about Ukraine. Ukrainians and Europeans have frequently complained that they have been shut out of the room or not brought in until it appears the United States and Russia have already come to some initial agreement. The sudden announcement of the 28-point plan resurfaced those suspicions.

At the negotiations in Geneva right now, many parties have gathered and seem to be having a series of bilateral discussions, rather than a plenary negotiation. The United States appears to be de facto leading the discussions, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio in the lead, along with Steve Witkoff, who has effectively served as a liaison to Russia. Ukraine sent Andriy Yermak, who is the head of the president’s office, and Rustem Umerov, the national security secretary, or effectively Rubio’s counterpart. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany sent their national security advisers, Jonathan Powell, Emmanuel Bonne, and Günter Sautter. Although Russia was not formally invited to the Geneva talks, the Kremlin is “closely monitoring the media reports” coming out of the talks, according to spokesman Dmitry Peskov.

In previous negotiations, the United States has attempted to play the role of neutral mediator. For example, in 2000, in attempting to resolve elements of the Israel-Palestine conflict, then-President Bill Clinton invited then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat to Camp David. He famously threw open the double doors to the negotiation rooms so that the two men could walk in at the exact same time, rather than have one seem to make a symbolic concession by walking in first.

That does not seem to be the role Donald Trump has chosen. Instead, the United States is publicly pressuring Ukraine to take the deal now. Invented time urgency is a classic pressure tactic. It can be effective, but it only works so many times before the tactic loses credibility.  

Meanwhile, European politicians are attempting to be a counterweight to U.S. pressure, recognizing the potential consequences of a rush to a fragile peace. But they also must face a hard reality: They are not yet ready to defend Ukraine on their own. The European defense infrastructure has dramatically improved in the last couple of years, but massive military ramp-ups take time. They may decide to let the United States walk away from the table, taking its military assistance with it, as President Trump has threatened, but the consequence will be at least an initial drop-off in Ukrainian military capability.

Q5: What are the parties’ strategies for these negotiations?

A5: For Russia, it’s a classic maximum value extraction approach. Moscow has routinely stuck to its positions, not giving an inch. In its view, the best alternative to a negotiated agreement is to keep fighting; Moscow thinks it is winning.

For Ukraine, the goal is just not to lose: survive another winter; keep building its defense industry and reducing dependency on the United States; and convince Russia it cannot win on the battlefield.

Europeans want Russia either thoroughly defeated, so it thinks twice about coming over any other borders, or they want Moscow bogged down and bleeding and unable to move against Europe. Better to beat Russian forces in the Donbas than to have to fight them in Warsaw, Tallin, or Helsinki.

Traditionally, the United States would be on the side of preserving an international order that has prevented land wars in Europe for 80 years. In that traditional approach, Russia would pay a price for unprovoked territorial grabs and for the economic damage it has wreaked upon Europe. Instead, the Trump administration seems to be seeking purely an end to the current bloodshed, at any cost to Ukraine. The administration is viewing the situation more like a Manhattan real estate transaction, with two dug-in parties who just need a little shove to close the deal. But this is not a contract for a renovated apartment building. Those deals have winners and losers, but the courts exist as a neutral third party to resolve any disputes. For Ukraine, when (not if) Moscow alleges that it has been wronged, the consequence is quite real and painful: a regrouped and stronger Russian army making a renewed land grab.

Q6: So will it work?

A6: President Trump has forced parties to the table many times in his short tenure. It is too early to tell which of these deals will stick, and which are purely short-term victories. In some cases, his unorthodox, hard-hitting approach has driven progress that no party thought was possible. It could do so again.

Ukraine is in a tough position, but it is one borne of hesitant Western policy choices. Kyiv is not losing on the battlefield, but it isn’t winning either. If the United States and Europe had committed in February 2022 to give Ukraine everything it needed to win, we would be in a far different position today. It might be Russia suing for peace. Instead, Russia can continue to throw people and materiel at the front, with zero regard for human casualties and a grim willingness to grind onward. Moscow believes it can outlast the West. To change this dynamic, Ukraine needs time and enough external support to allow its own military industrial base to evolve into the titan it can become. Innovations like small drones and big flamingos will continue to come out of Ukraine, and the West would be foolish to let them fall into Russian hands.

There is an opportunity for a win-win outcome to these negotiations. It looks like this: Washington and Europe appropriately read Moscow’s intentions as hostile. Moscow doesn’t want a good deal—it wants dominion over the 39 million people of Ukraine. And it will not stop there. Recognizing this, Washington and European capitals commit to supporting Ukraine militarily and financially until Russia has withdrawn from all the territory it took. Europe keeps funding the war effort; Ukraine keeps using that cash to buy U.S. weapons systems. The U.S. economy benefits, Europe bears a large share of the cost, and Russia continues to be bogged down in a war it never should have begun. Europe wins because their eastern flank is more secure, and they have time to bolster their defenses. The United States wins because Washington continues to sell U.S. equipment and because China is distracted by Russia’s misadventure. And Ukraine wins by living to fight another day, leaning further into its western ties, and innovating its way to a future strong economy. The only loser is Russia, and that is right and proper. They must lose this fight.

None of these things will happen at this table this week. Rather, this negotiation should be a step forward to an enduring peace, with a strong message sent to Moscow that it will not win through a campaign of brutal territorial expansion.

Emily Harding is director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program and vice president of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.